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“Outcomes” can be broadly defined as the results of Government interventions.  Considerable 
effort, both in New Zealand and overseas, is focussing on ways in which information on 
outcomes can be better integrated into public policy decision-making.  
This paper outlines the environment for outcomes focussed management in New Zealand and 
discusses some innovative examples of the use of outcomes in public management. It 
provides a background for further work focussed on integrating the use of outcomes in public 
management. 
The first part of the paper describes both how outcomes can be used  and how outcomes are 
used to influence decision-making in New Zealand. It traces through the use of outcomes at 
various stages of the decision-making process, from whole-of-Government strategy setting and 
the budget process, to departmental planning processes. It also notes where there are 
opportunities for greater use of outcomes. 
The second part describes some innovative examples of the use of outcomes in public 
management in New Zealand. It examines the use of: 
  outcomes by the Department of Corrections to focus expenditure on rehabilitative 
interventions more effectively; 
  outcomes-based funding arrangements for employment programmes by the Department of 
Work and Income; 
  an outcomes-based model by the Land Transport Safety Authority that predicts the road-
safety outcomes of various combinations of interventions; 
  outcomes measures in the Biodiversity Strategy to monitor progress halting the decline of 
New Zealand’s indigenous biodiversity; and 
  outcomes targets in the Maori Education Strategy.  
 
* This paper was originally prepared as New Zealand’s country paper for an OECD Expert Meeting on Outcomes 
Focussed Management in Paris on the 18-19 January 2001. A slightly modified version was used as a background 
paper for a presentation by Andrew Kibblewhite at a conference on “Managing Successful Policy Reforms” in the 
Wellington Town Hall on the 14th of February 2001. The authors would like to thank Roger Waite, Linda Cameron, 
Tony Bliss, Tony Gavin, Grant Baker, Mary-Anne Thompson, Tom Berthold and David Galt. 2 




1.   New Zealand’s public sector management system has been in place for over a decade. 
The intent of the reforms of the late 1980s and early 1990s was to shift the focus from how 
much was spent, to what it was spent on and why. An explicit part of the reforms was to 
outline the separate responsibilities of Ministers and Chief Executives. Scott, Bushnell and 
Sallee state: 
 
The approach taken in the New Zealand financial management reforms is to require chief 
executives to be directly responsible for the outputs produced by the departments, while the 
ministers choose which outputs should be produced and should therefore have to answer 
directly themselves for the outcomes. 
 
2.    This vision has not been realised in the way that was originally envisaged. It does 
illustrate, however, the central role that outcomes played in the financial management 
reforms. Conceptually, the New Zealand system focuses on outcomes. There have, however, 
been significant implementation difficulties for a variety of reasons and work continues to 




Whole of Government Strategy 
 
3.    The Government sets the highest level outcome goals. The Fiscal Responsibility Act 
(1994) requires the Government, in the Budget Policy Statement, to: 
  
specify the broad strategic priorities by which the Government will be guided in preparing the 
Budget for that financial year. 
 
4.   Since the mid-1990s this requirement has meet by various sets of goals under various 
names. There have been “Strategic Result Areas”, “Strategic Priorities and Overarching 
Goals”, and currently, “Key Government Goals to Guide Public Sector Policy and Performance” 
(which are attached as an annex).  
 
5.   In general, these goals are not so much goals as statements of broad direction. They are 
not tightly specified, and no targets or quantifiable measures have been developed to measure 
progress against them.  
 
Outcomes in the Budget Process 
 
6.   The high-level goals have been used to varying degrees as a prioritisation tool in the 
budget process. The Public Finance Act requires Ministers to identify in the Estimates 
(Ministers’ requests to Parliament for appropriations): 
 
the link between the classes of outputs to be purchased by the Crown and the Government’s 
desired outcomes. 
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7.   Current practice is variable, although, for the most part, this has been done in a cursory 
fashion merely by asserting that output a contributes to outcome goal b. Ministers are not 
required to produce measures to demonstrate this or to provide a gauge for future 
performance.  Also, because there is a relatively high number of Ministerial portfolios and 
departments, few key goals are the responsibility of a single Minister or department. This is 
one reason why it tends not to be possible to hold individual Ministers or agencies responsible 
for achieving outcome goals.  
 
8.    This requirement to link outputs to outcomes in the Estimates is not the only way 
outcomes feature in the budget process though. The greater part of Ministerial scrutiny of 
expenditure in the budget process is of new spending proposals, even though this constitutes 
less than 5% of total expenditure.  
 
9.   A key tool in managing the prioritisation of new spending proposals is through a fiscal 
management tool called the fiscal provisions. As part of being transparent about its short-term 
fiscal objectives, each year the Government must outline how much it intends to spend that 
year and the two following. Informally, this statement of fiscal intentions is built upon a fiscal 
provisions framework that sets the level of additional discretionary Government expenditure 
(there are separate provisions for capital and operating expenditure). The Government 
commits to fiscal provisions that effectively limit the amount it can spend on new policy 
decisions. 
 
10.    The fiscal provisions, in combination with the Key Government Goals, make for a 
powerful prioritisation tool. They set a transparent budget constraint, and outline what the 
highest priorities are within that constraint.  Because demand for funding exceeds supply, 
there are incentives for Ministers to demonstrate that proposed new expenditure is worthwhile 
and will contribute to the Government’s outcomes. Ministers are not required to provide 
outcome measures in support of the new proposals, but they are required to indicate how the 
intervention would be evaluated. This is a new requirement, and so can  be expected to yield 
more useful information as time passes. Although Treasury may negotiate evaluation criteria 
with the department, it is less likely to negotiate outcome measures, although there are no 
systems barriers to stop it doing so. 
 
11.   Few formal processes exist to assess the value for money of baseline expenditure (as 
opposed to new spending proposals), although that is slowly changing.  
  
12.   Thus, from a macro, planning perspective, outcome goals do inform the budget, at least 
at the margin of new expenditure. These outcome goals tend not to be accompanied by 
outcome measures, however. 
 
Departmental Strategic Planning 
 
13.   The Government’s high level goals are translated into departments’ planning in various 
ways, including through “key priorities” (previously know as “key result areas”). Since the 
high-level goals have generally been so broadly defined, most departments can tie many of 
their activities back to at least one of them. Departments choose their key priorities, although 
central agencies have some input, both to perform a quality assurance role, and to get an 
overview of the government-wide picture. 
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14.   Key priorities usually form a key part of the Chief Executive’s Performance Agreement 
and for the most part are driven down into the department’s business relatively effectively. 
Key priorities are supposed to be SMART - Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Results-focussed 
and Time bound. Since Chief Executives are held accountable for delivering on these key 
priorities, they tend to be outputs rather than outcomes. As such, it would be desirable if there 
were accompanying outcome goals and targets that could indicate how progress was being 
made achieving the goal the key priority contributes to. These have often been lacking. 
 
15.   Initiatives are underway to improve the quality of departmental strategic planning and 
to make it more outcome focussed. This should be reflected in improved ex ante reporting to 
Parliament.   
 
Translating Strategy into Action  
 
Outputs, Outcomes and Accountability 
 
16.   Both the budget and departmental planning documents translate strategy into action, at 
varying levels of specificity. The budget contains general output information, but more specific 
information is contained in a Purchase Agreement (soon to be changed and called an "Output 
Agreement"). This agreement contains detailed information about all the outputs a department 
is producing that year. The purchase agreement generally contains relatively little information 
on the outcomes an output contributes to. This reflects its status as an agreement between 
the Minister and the Chief Executive on what the department will do, rather than as a public 
document explaining why the Government is purchasing those particular outputs. 
   
17.   This apparent focus on outputs at the departmental level has to be understood in the 
context of the sharp distinction made between the responsibilities of chief executives and 
Ministers. The distinction is closely linked with the way accountability is thought of in the New  
Zealand system. In an accountability relationship, performance may attract rewards and 
sanctions. The external parties to whom chief executives report have a power to act on that 
performance information. Hence it is critical that managers have control over the performance 
dimensions for which they are held accountable.   
 
18.   In general, it is more difficult to hold managers to account for outcomes than outputs 
for a number of reasons, including problems of: 
 
•  determining causality accurately; 
 
•  significant time-lags; 
 
•  lack of information and information asymmetries. 
 
19.   The notion of controllability is central to our thinking about accountability and this is 
why Chief executives are not held accountable for outcomes that are beyond their reasonable 
control. Of course, decision-makers can be held accountable for the decisions they make, and 
they can be held accountable for managing risks that arise to the extent of their management 
authority. In the same way, policy managers can be held accountable for the quality for policy 
advice they provide, which includes appropriate consideration of risks and externalities. 
Operational managers can be held accountable for managing processes to mitigate adverse 5 
externalities and risks, and to do all they can to produce the desired outcomes. (For further 
information on management of outcome risks see the section dealing with that, below.)  
 
20.   Because chief executives are explicitly accountable for outputs, considerably more effort 
has gone into describing and measuring outputs than outcomes. As a result, we are much 
better at output specification than outcome specification. However, we can still do better at 
output specification, so that managers can genuinely be held accountable for those things 
that, intuitively, are within their reasonable span of control.  
 
21.   None of this is to say, of course, that there are not areas where managers can be held 
accountable for outcomes. There are some areas of Government activity where experience 
shows it is possible to hold managers accountable for outcomes. For example the Governor of 
the Reserve Bank has authority to set monetary policy and is held accountable for holding 
inflation within a specified target. Other examples of outcome management included later in 
this report suggest more sophisticated measurement and analytical systems can bring 
outcomes to the fore as an instrument of accountability. In some circumstances, in other 
words, output quality measures can be specified in such a way that the Chief Executive can 
effectively be held accountable for the desired outcome. Our approach to outcomes has to be 
situation sensitive though, so that managers' accountabilities are pitched at an appropriate 
level for the tasks they are asked to perform. 
 
22.   In practice, the focus on outputs at the accountability end of the system, has seen less 
work put into thinking about outcomes than is desirable. As a result, there is a wide 
divergence in the way that outcomes are used in departmental management.  Outcome 
measures tend not to influence chief executive performance assessment unless it is clear that 
the chief executive can be held accountable for the outcomes. 
 
23.   However, just because outcomes have been underdone in practice does not mean that a 
focus on outputs is not both important and appropriate. One of the key benefits of keeping a 
focus on outputs within formal management systems is that this ensures a better 
understanding of what is done by the Public Service and this is a prerequisite for assessing 
value for money. Other parts of that puzzle include good information about what those outputs 
cost and outcome information indicating whether the outputs had the desired effect. In other 
words, good outcome information is an addition, not a replacement, for good output 
information.    
 
24.   A key focus for improving outcome information is the policy advice process. After all, the 
key function of policy advice is to identify what the problem is, and how to solve or mitigate it. 
This involves making judgments, based on evidence and sound reasoning, of how outputs 
contribute to desired outcomes. This can go hand-in-hand with a more sophisticated 
understanding of risk management as part of output specification. The biggest contribution to 
improved Government performance in achieving outcomes is likely to come from improved 
policy advice, based on better information. 
 
States of the World Information 
 
25.   There are several different types of indicators that are relevant for outcomes focussed 
management, including (in increasing order of sophistication): 
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•  states of the world indicators, which provide a snapshot of the world or aspects of it - 
e.g. percentage of children sitting and achieving School Certificate in 5 subjects. 
•  effectiveness indicators, which attempt to measure the success of particular 
interventions - e.g. percentage of offenders in a target risk band re-offending within 12 
months of release, following a particular intervention, compared with a matched-pair 
control group; 
•  risk indicators, which suggest where interventions should be targeted – e.g. risk of 
imprisonment within 5 years 
    
26.   One project currently underway is looking at how we can improve the quality of states of 
the world information available about the state of New Zealand society.  States information 
differs from effectiveness information as it does not rely on causal inference about the 
relationship between the intervention and the way the world is. By collecting comparable 
information across time and across location, policy makers and decision makers can see how 
the world is changing. States information has at least two key uses: 
 
•  ex ante it can guide prioritisation choices, by showing where the serious problems are. 
 
•  ex post it can guide evaluations of effectiveness by providing benchmarks of change. 
Analysts can then use this knowledge about the world to make inductive judgments 
about the effectiveness of various interventions. 
 
27.   Some departments have already developed relatively comprehensive sets of states of 
the world measures. Fewer departments, however, have specific effectiveness measures that 
are intended to reflect the success of various interventions. This reflects the complexity of the 
public policy environment where many outcomes are reflected by a wide variety of 




28.   In an outcomes context, evaluation is impact evaluation. Ex ante analysis and 
assessment of proposed interventions is part of the core policy advice process, but the ex ante 
analysis needs to be backed up ex post by evaluation of the effectiveness of the intervention, 
when cost-effective. Impact evaluation may involve more than just setting and monitoring 
effectiveness indicators. It can also include some more in-depth analysis of causes and 
effects, and so seek further opportunities for greater value for money. 
 
29.    Impact evaluation is probably underdone in the New Zealand public sector. Chief 
executive and departmental performances are assessed, but outcome measures and 
evaluations rarely feature in these assessments. The outcomes of policies/ 
programmes/projects tend to be evaluated on an ad hoc basis, with some exceptions. In 
general: 
 
•  there are limited requirements to evaluate existing programmes, and  
 
•  in many departments there is not a strong culture of evaluation. 
 
30.   The Government has investigated requiring all policy proposals going to Cabinet to have 
evaluation criteria stated, but this was seen as impractical. In particular, there was a risk that 
agencies would develop a compliance attitude towards evaluation, rather than focussing on it 7 
when it adds value. Central agencies are focusing on improving evaluation criteria when 
discussing policy proposals with departments. However, the Government is still determining a 
systems-wide approach to evaluation. 
 
31.   Budget initiative bids are required to include evaluation criteria. Ministers must outline 
if the proposal has been evaluated, and if so, what the results are. If not, Ministers must 
outline how they will measure the success of the initiative. This information has only been 
required since the 2000 Budget so it is not yet clear how effective this will be at increasing the 
value that evaluation adds to the policy process. 
 
Co-ordination and Outcomes Risks 
 
32.    Outcomes are the key focus of Government activity, around which Government co-
ordination should be managed. To enable such co-ordination, there need to be shared high-
level strategies and shared outcome targets. Shared outcome targets make explicit what the 
Government is trying to achieve, and allow trade-offs to be made among different means of 
achieving the target. 
 
33.   Co-ordination is required beyond just the planning phase however. Managers also need 
to be aware of risks that can arise to hinder the achievement of the outcome. In a complex 
system, an intervention from one department can have a negative effect on the effectiveness 
of an intervention from another.  There are many and varied interrelationships between 
interventions and outcomes in most social policy areas. For example housing, education, 
welfare, environment, food safety and economic policies - the responsibilities of a range of 
Ministers - will impact on public health, which is within the purview of the Minister of Health. 
Thus being aware what the outcomes risks are, and how they can be managed is critical both 
at the policy advice phase and the implementation phase. 
 
34.   In New Zealand there are some institutional mechanisms for identifying and managing 
outcome risks, however we do not do enough to be proactive about this at the whole-of-
government strategy level. Nor is outcome risk management sufficiently explicit in the way 
outputs are specified nor in managers’ performance agreements. However, Cabinet does have 
various consultation requirements for Cabinet papers - papers with implications for women, 
for example, must be discussed with the Ministry for Women’s Affairs. In this way, key 
agencies responsible for various outcomes can ensure that outcomes risks arising across 
Government can be identified. In fact, a key role of the so-called “population ministries” is to 
identify and help manage outcome risks. 
 
  35.    Apart from these institutional arrangements, there are at present few explicit 
requirements around outcome risks. As a result, departmental practice of identification and 
management of outcome risks is likely to be variable,   
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Section 2: Examples 
 
36.   These examples illustrate some of the ways that outcome goals, measures and targets 








37.    New Zealand’s Department of Corrections has been developing a set of outcome 
measures on the effectiveness of rehabilitative programmes delivered to convicted offenders. 
The Government spends around NZ$32 million per annum on rehabilitative programmes for 
convicted offenders both in prison and in the community. The programmes are intended to 
reduce re-offending and so reduce the future cost of re-offending. This contributes to the 
Government’s goal of building safer communities. 
 
38.   The aim of the outcomes management project is to identify the effectiveness of specific 
rehabilitative programmes at reducing offending among a targeted group of offenders. Prison 
officers and probation officers will then be able to place offenders on programmes that are 
statistically most likely to be effective, given the offender’s risk profile. Senior Managers will 
be in a better position to advise the Minister of Corrections which programmes should be 
offered where and to whom, and, significantly, Ministers will be in a better position to trade-off 
spending on offender rehabilitation programmes vs. other spending priorities based on robust 
cost-benefit data. 
 
The Outcomes Measurement Model 
 
39.    The model is built around a cost-benefit equation that takes into account both the 
societal costs of crime and the cost-effectiveness of rehabilitative programmes. The basic 
cost-benefit equation is: 
 




•  BC is the benefit - cost ratio for a specific intervention; 
 
•  CPH is the future cost per head of untreated offenders, which is defined as the average 
direct cost or total seriousness score of all offences committed over the next 5 years by 
individuals within the primary target group; 
 
•  RQ is the actual (or expected) Rehabilitation Quotient of a given intervention, as 
measured on the primary target group;  
 
•  RCPH is the rehabilitation cost per head given a rehabilitative intervention; and 
 
•  i  indicates that the calculation’s inputs (and thus output) are specific to a particular 
intervention and the particular target group it is delivered to. 9 
 
40.   It is relatively easy to determine cost of delivering a rehabilitation programme per head. 
The more sophisticated measures are the future cost per head (CPH) and the rehabilitation 
quotient (RQ). 
 
Future Cost per Head 
 
41.    This measure takes account both of the direct cost to the police/courts/corrections 
systems plus an estimate of the cost to society of an offender’s re-offending over a five year 
period. The future cost per head data was determined by following 28000 criminal careers 
from 1993 to 1998 and counting the total length of sentences and numbers of offences in 
each offence class. Separate counts are completed for each risk band.  Risk of imprisonment 
(RoI) and risk of reconviction (RoC) rates are determined for each of ten target groups, into 
which offenders are grouped. A profile is thus established for each of the target groups, which 




42.   The rehabilitation quotient (RQ) quantifies the reduction in the re-offending rate, as a 
percentage, due to rehabilitative interventions delivered to the target group. The RQ is 
measured by comparing an intervention group with a statistically valid, matched pair control 
group. Statistical demands mean that identifying RQs has been the most difficult data set to 
gain, given the relatively small size of New Zealand’s offender population. However, the 
department plans to have robust RQ measures for its current set of programmes by February 
2001. The mean RQ for a good adult programme is around 10-15%, while RQs for some youth 
programmes have approached 40%. 
 
43.    When RQs are available, a benefit-cost ratio can be determined that indicates how 
benefits compare to costs for a given intervention targeted at a given target group of 
offenders. Benefit-cost ratios of 1.8 to 30 have been obtained using RQ data from separate 
evaluations and from literature sources. 
 
Applying the model 
 
44.    The benefit-cost model gives an accurate picture of the effectiveness of specific 
interventions targeted at specific groups. When the department has sufficient data to calculate 
RQs for its current (core) programmes, it will be in a position to calculate the benefit-cost 
ratios for those core programmes. Thus it will be directly able to prioritise programmes and 
target programmes better at offenders. 
 
45.    The department will also calculate cost-benefit ratios from pilot programme results. 
Existing CPH and RCPH information, can be combined with RQs based on overseas research 
or best estimates to determine the likely benefit-cost ratio. The estimated benefit-cost ratio 
can then be tested in the pilot. If predictions are borne out, the pilot can then become a core 
programme, competing for core funding on the basis of its cost-benefit score. Pilot 
information can continually be fed into the core programme prioritisation system to ensure 
that Ministers get best value for the money they spend.    
 
46.   The benefit-cost ratio information has also been used to determine how much 
expenditure is justified on rehabilitation programmes. Ministers may determine a minimum 10 
benefit-cost threshold and fund everything within that threshold. Since there will always be 
constraints on Government expenditure, funding limits will see continuous improvement as 
the best pilots displace programmes in the core. 
 
47.   Data will continue to feed into the system through time, so that continuous evaluation 
can occur. The department will continue to operate matched pair control groups to recalculate 
RQs.  
 
Governance and Accountability 
 
48.   This system will not be fully implemented until February, when risk data is put onto the 
system and can be computed.  Robust RQs are yet to be finalised.  The outcomes 
management project will have a significant effect on the way that the department manages its 
rehabilitation programmes. Initially it will provide information to aid decision making; 
managers and case workers will continue to be held accountable for delivering their outputs, 
rather than outcomes. Continuation of funding will, however, be increasingly dependent on 




Outcomes Based Funding for Employment Programmes (Department of Work and Income) 
 
49.    This example, which is still at the pilot stage, shows the potential use of outcome 
measures and targets in managing contracts with non-departmental providers. It is an explicit 
example of accountability for outcomes in the New Zealand public service, which illustrates 
the value of thinking carefully about output specification.  
 
50.   The Department of Work and Income is responsible both for assisting job seekers find 
work, and for assessing and paying benefits. A significant part of its business is contracting 
employment programmes and services from third-parties to minimise unemployment.  
 
51. In the past, these programmes have been funded on an activities or outputs basis: the 
provider is paid based only on the number of programmes they deliver. Because the contracts 
for services with employment programme providers needed to be specified up front, case 
managers were constrained over the choice of programmes they could suggest customers 
enrolled on. 
 
52.   The department currently contracts with individual providers for training and/or other 
programmes (e.g. Work Confidence, ESOL and Industry based training programmes).  It is 
piloting contracts that combine some sort of payment for activity with payment for achieving 
an outcome or output. If successful, such output contracts, with outcome performance 
measures, could show that it is possible to incorporate rich outcome measures that matter for 
accountability into output contracts. There are also, to date, some examples of contracts that 
are solely outcomes based, although there is obviously a risk here that a provider can be paid 
for doing nothing, if the contract is not well specified. The long-term success and impact of 
these approaches is still to be determined.   
 
Progress to date 
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53.   In line with international trends, the department is proposing to extend an outcomes 
based approach in New Zealand.  This approach is one that strengthens the focus on 
achieving specified employment outcomes, and provides support to this process through 
increased programme and funding flexibility.  This involves, in the medium term, the 
development of a series of small pilots that will test issues around: 
 
-  appropriate target groups for the initiative; 
-  specification of outcomes that should be achieved; 
-  costs to the department of specific groups for a set period as a basis for setting a 
“price”; and 
-  funding formulae and accountability frameworks that are appropriate to the local 
delivery environment.   
 
54.   If the pilots are successful, they could inform the development of an outcomes based 
approach in relation to the department’s mainstream delivery of employment programmes.  
There may also be potential in the longer term for extending this approach to other core 
services. 
 
55.    In some regions, the department has been contracting for services with pay for 
performance based on achieving the desired outcome. Third-party providers are paid an up-
front fee for service, but the bulk of the payment comes later when the customer finds and 
remains in a job. For example, the provider may get a fee upfront, an incentive or performance 
payments when the customer gets a job, a further payment if the customer stays in the job for 
13 weeks, and a further payment when the customer has stayed in the job for 26 weeks.  
Research suggests that after 6 months or so, the relationship between the employee and 
employer assumes greater importance than the relationship between case manager/trainer 
and customer. 
 
56.   There have also been some contracts where providers receive no upfront fee, but are 




57.   In line with the aim of devolving responsibility for choosing programmes to the most 
appropriate level, the department is looking at developing the use of outcomes based funding 
contracts further. One option is to contract out case management services to local providers. 
Contracts could focus on the outcomes to be achieved, without limiting the programmes that 
the funding could be used for. The department would specify an outcome or a hierarchy of 
outcomes such as: 
 
-  The client is placed in stable unsubsidised employment. 
-  The client has been placed in stable employment for three months. 
-  The client is in unsubsidised employment. 
-  The client is in subsidised employment. 
 
58.    The provider would be paid as the client achieved each of those outcomes and so 
funding would not follow programmes, but individual clients. Contestability should see a 
culture of continuous improvement develop so that the funding goes to the most effective 
providers and programmes.  
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59.   An outcomes based funding approach will only be effective, however, when: 
 
-  There is a clear statement of the desired outcome; 
-  Providers have the capability to manage service delivery on an outcome based funding 
model; 
-  Outcome payment is targeted to client risk and need, so that providers are not 
incentivised to concentrate on short-term temporary unemployed who could find jobs 
by themselves;  
-  There are incentives to ensure that the provider has an interest in the person remaining 
in the job for a certain period; and 




60.    The goal of funding employment assistance on an outcomes basis is to reduce the 
persistence and incidence of unemployment. Short-term unemployed pose far fewer costs to 
society than a core of long-term unemployed, who are likely to be the hardest to get into jobs. 
As a result work is underway to develop better tools to assess risk.  
 
61.    An evaluation of the success of the outcomes funding model will need to focus on 




62.   It is possible to contract for these services and measure aspects of performance on an 
outcomes basis. The accountability issues are more complex in an outcomes based approach 
and require robust measures and monitoring of performance against outcomes.   There are 
risks of providers under-performing or undertaking undesirable activities that are not picked 
up by an outcomes based performance framework.   
 
63.   In order to fund on an outcomes basis though, robust prices are needed to ensure both 
that the Government is getting value for money and that providers (many of which are not-for-
profits) remain viable. In running the pilots, the department will need to determine the cost of 
specific target groups for specific periods as a basis for setting the “price”.  The report 
collects historical data on length of benefit receipt of its clients, and this can be accessed for 
particular groups. 








64.    The National Road Safety Committee has recently released “Road Safety Strategy 
2010”. The strategy outlines options for reducing the social cost of crashes on New Zealand’s 
roads, and seeks public feedback on which option to choose.  
 
65.   The previous road safety plan - National Road Safety 1995 - aimed to achieve a level of 
road safety equivalent to the safest countries in the world. The updated plan has a more 13 
modest target. The goal is to achieve current (i.e. 2000) world’s best practice by 2010. At 
present, New Zealand has around twice as many deaths per 100 000 persons and deaths per 
10 000 vehicles as the safest countries in the world. 
 
66.    There are three interesting aspects of this work from the perspective of outcomes 
focussed management. One is the manner in which the actual outcomes targets will be set. 
The second is how these targets are translated into interventions at minimum cost. The third 
is how people are held accountable for achieving the targets.  
 
Setting the Targets 
 
67.   As noted above, the overall outcome goal is to achieve current world’s best practice by 
2010. This high level goal, measured in terms of social cost is built upon a hierarchy of 
targets. Social cost is underpinned by final outcome targets such as the road death toll (target 
2010 = 295). Beneath this are intermediate outcome targets - targets like proportion of drunk 
drivers, the average speeds on various types of roads. Underneath these are output targets 
such as the number of police traffic patrols, the number of anti-drink driving or anti-speeding 
advertisements shown or the number of passing lanes. Some of the targets can also be broken 
down by region and by road user groups - cyclists, pedestrians and older drivers for example. 
 
68.   The targets are set using a mathematical model that predicts road safety outcomes. The 
model is built upon a set of assumptions derived from a wealth of historical crash and roading 
information. This snapshot of New Zealand road safety is the base from which a set of 
mathematical functions predict how various interventions and other factors should affect road 
safety outcomes. 
 
69.   For each of around 12000 categories of casualty type, the current outcome is taken 
from the historical datasets. The current outcome is then adjusted to a 2010 baseline level. 
This adjusted baseline takes account of factors outside road safety agencies’ control such as 
increased traffic volumes. The 2010 baseline outcome provides a benchmark against which 
predicted improvements can be measured.  
 
70.    Interventions are now added to the mix. For each of the 12000 casualty types, the 
predicted effectiveness of various interventions is calculated. The calculation is based both on 
the rate of effectiveness for an intervention, and the number of times the intervention is used.  
Thus we are left with predictions of how using specified amounts of specified interventions 
would affect the road safety outcomes for each category of casualty type. These results can 
then be aggregated to produce a full picture of how a mix of interventions can be expected to 
affect road safety outcomes. 
 
71.   The mix of interventions can also be costed to give a robust cost-benefit ratio for any 
given mix of interventions. Officials are still working to determine appropriate costings for 
different interventions. 
 
72.   Thus policy makers and decision makers have relatively good ex ante information, based 
on historical data and transparent assumptions, on which to base decisions on future 
interventions. The information can also be used to set targets. For example, the predictive 
model may suggest that an extremely costly set of interventions is likely to produce the lowest 
absolute reduction in the social cost of accidents. An intervention mix such as lowering the 
open speed limit to 20km/h and policing it strictly would probably lower the social cost of 14 
accidents near to zero. However, given the total costs this poses on society, this is unlikely to 





73.   When the public consultation process is completed, Ministers will choose the targets. 
They can then use the cost/benefit information to determine which interventions are most 
likely to achieve the desired road safety outcomes at least cost. Throughout the life of the 
strategy, the outcomes predicted by the model can be tested against the outcomes actually 
achieved and the intervention mix can be altered accordingly. Thus a feedback and evaluation 
loop is effectively in place. New data will also help modellers refine the functions that predict 




74.   These outcomes are the result of the outputs of a group of agencies, especially the road 
safety agencies and the Police. The aim is for the National Road Safety Committee to take 
collective responsibility for the overall achievement of the social cost and final outcomes 
targets. Outcomes performance monitoring will continue on a quarterly basis with annual 
reviews, while formal reviews will be held every three years. 
 
75.   It is likely that the Land Transport Safety Authority, as the lead agency, will continue to 
be held accountable for these final outcomes, as in its current performance agreement. 
However, individual agency accountabilities will be more clearly specified within the 
performance management framework set out by the final strategy. 
 
76.    The envisaged accountability arrangements will ‘bite’ harder than the current ones 
because they are based on a more rigorous and transparent analytical base. Certain 
difficulties associated with linking specific outputs to final outcomes will not disappear, but 
performance expectations will be more clearly defined and tracked across the full suite of road 
environment, vehicle and road user interventions. Regular review and ex post evaluations will 





New Zealand Biodiversity Strategy (Department of Conservation, lead) 
Context 
    
77.    The New Zealand Biodiversity Strategy (NZBS) was released in March 2000 and 
aims to halt the decline of New Zealand’s indigenous biodiversity. The strategy has a 20-
year timeframe and establishes a framework of goals, objectives and actions that are 
required to halt the decline.  Priority actions have been identified and are currently being 
implemented that will lead to the greatest gains in biodiversity in the next five years.  The 
strategy covers terrestrial, freshwater and marine biodiversity. A key feature of the strategy 
is that it does not focus solely on biodiversity on the Crown owned Conservation estate, but 
seeks to halt the decline in biodiversity nationwide, including on private property.   
Partnerships are needed to ensure that the strategy is successful, allowing the participation of 15 
all New Zealanders, not just Central Government. Other key participants are Local 
Government, the private sector, iwi and local communities.  
 
78.   The strategy includes a wide range of initiatives. Some are designed to halt the decline 
in biodiversity, while others, such as information gathering programmes, are to ensure that 
outcomes can be measured. The strategy is still at an early stage, so reporting on outcomes in 
relation to the strategic goals in the strategy is some years off. The major report after the first 
year (in October 2001) will focus on auditing the implementation of the priority actions in the 
strategy. The report after the second year will include some preliminary intermediate 
outcomes related directly to those actions (e.g. number of possums killed). Only after the third 
year will there be reporting against outcomes relating to the strategic goals in the strategy 
(e.g. reduction in rate of deforestation, change in number of key species).  
 
Outcomes Measures in the Strategy 
  
79.    Outcomes measures and targets are used in the strategy to determine priorities for 
funding, and to determine the effectiveness of interventions.  There is a wide variety of 
projects, some involving information gathering for monitoring and evaluation purposes.   
Outcome measures have been developed for some programmes and are still being developed 
for others. Nevertheless, it is useful to give some examples. 
 
Offshore Island Eradications 
 
80.    New Zealand has a number of off-shore islands that are sanctuaries for protected 
species. A project is underway to eradicate pests or to manage them at sustainable levels so 
that they do not pose a threat to each of the islands’ unique environment. This involves both 
eradicating pests, and ensuring that they do not come back. The key intermediate outcome 
measure for these projects is the presence or absence of target pests on the islands two years 
after the operation is completed. This is measured by sophisticated trapping and monitoring 
programmes. Longer term, the desired outcome is to halt the decline of biodiversity, by 
ensuring the protection and recovery of at risk species.  
 
Increasing Protected Areas on Private Land 
 
81.   The goal of this programme is to purchase, or support the effective management of, private 
lands with high biodiversity values. The programme aims to apply increased funding to existing 
mechanisms to ensure that a wider range of natural habitats and ecosystems are protected. 
Results will be measured using   ecological criteria and other appropriate measures.  Longer-term 
measures for assessing the contribution of the programme to the goals in the strategy are still 
being developed.  
 
Terrestrial and Freshwater Biodiversity Information System 
 
82.   The aim of this project is to develop awareness of and access to existing information, as well 
as gathering and providing new information. The intermediate outcome is to have developed 
systems for gathering and accessing information, to improve knowledge about biodiversity and to 
increase public awareness about the state of New Zealand’s biodiversity.  
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83.   Initial targets are focussed on the development of appropriate systems to collect, manage 
and disseminate the information. Longer term targets are still being developed. 
 
Using the Measures 
 
84.    The primary purposes of collecting the outcomes information is to increase our 
understanding of New Zealand’s biodiversity and to halt the decline of indigenous biodiversity. The 
information will be used to assess the effectiveness of various projects, and to determine 
priorities. It can inform both what the desired outcomes should be and how they should change 
across time, and which interventions should be used to achieve those outcomes. Measuring the 
extent to which the desired outcomes have been achieved is also a useful information base for 
evaluating the overall success of the strategy from a process perspective. 
 
85.   The 20 year strategy has a funding plan for the first five years. Reprioritisation can begin 
when outcome results start to emerge. A major review after five years will assess success and 




86.   As is usual practice in the New Zealand public service, managers are held accountable for 
managing the particular programmes. This can include assessing their success at managing risks 
that arise, including outcome risks.  
 
87.   The overall strategy is the responsibility of a Ministerial Group responsible for implementing 
the New Zealand Biodiversity Strategy. This Group is supported by a Central Government 
Coordinating Group of Chief Executives of the relevant agencies.  Accountability for the overall 
management of the strategy is being bedded down through separate agency’s purchase and Chief 





Maori Education Strategy (Ministry of Education) 
Context 
 
88.   One of the Government’s key priorities is to reduce the inequalities in society, particularly in 
relation to the inequalities between Maori and Pacific peoples on the one hand and the rest of the 
population on the other. Maori and Pacific peoples as a group fare worse, on average, than the 
population as a whole. A co-ordinated effort is underway to reduce these disparities and to ensure 
that all New Zealanders have the opportunity to participate fully in society. 
 
89.   Three areas, in particular, are being targeted: education, employment and health. Outcome 
measures and targets have been developed for all of them. The nature of the social inequalities 
means however that a long-term timeframe is required to see if the desired outcomes are 17 
achieved. Significant educational outcomes especially can only be assessed after 10 or even 15 
years of the intervention. 
 
90.    This paper focuses on the definition, measurement and use of education outcomes 
within the Maori education strategy. 
 
Reducing Education Inequalities 
 
91.   It is well recognised that educational achievement is a key determinant of achievement later 
in life. As a result, much of the early focus has been on improving Maori educational performance.  
 
92.   The outcome indicators developed do not cover the whole ambit of the education system. 
Instead, a set of key indicators has been chosen, which research suggests are the best indicators 
of ongoing improvement and success in Maori educational achievement and reducing inequalities 
between Maori and non-Maori. 
 
93.   The desired outcomes are broken down into participation and achievement goals for early 
childhood, school and tertiary education. Some of the outcomes, and indicators for them, are 
outlined below: 
 
Early Childhood Education 
 
Goal Measure  Target 
Increase Maori 
participation in early 
childhood education 
Percentage of Maori aged 
0-4 enrolled  
65% by 2006 
 




Goal Measure  Target 
Increase rate of Maori 
participation in school 
education 
Rate of Maori suspensions 
per 1000 students 
Reduce rate to 5 per 1000 
by 2008 and to 3 per 1000 
by 2016 
Increase the achievement 
rate of Maori students in 
senior secondary 
education 
Rate of achievement of A, 
B and C grades in School 
Certificate and University 
Bursary 
Increase by 12% by 2010 
and to parity by 2020 
 




Goal Measure  Target 18 
Increase participation of 
Maori students in tertiary 
education 
Percentage of students 
who are Maori  
13.8% by 2002, up to 
16.7% by 2006 
Increase achievement of 
Maori students in tertiary 
education 
Percentage of graduates 
who are Maori 
15.1% by 2002, up to 
18.2% by 2006 
 
Using the Outcome Measures 
 
94.   A variety of products have been developed in addition to the goals, measures and targets. In 
particular there are regular monitoring reports, which assess progress across the board, and 
evaluation reports, which assess the effectiveness of specific programmes. 
 
95.    Each goal is supported by a strategy to achieve it. For example, alongside the goal to 
increase Maori participation in early childhood education are a number of strategies including: 
 
•  examining ways of removing barriers,  
 
•  promoting the benefits of early childhood education; and  
 
•  expanding the availability of early childhood services. 
 
96.   Progress against the goal will be informative, but will not indicate which interventions are 
effective and which are not. Across time, it will become apparent where progress is being made 
and where continued efforts should be focused, but the outcome indicators will not show which 
interventions offer value for money. Hence, evaluation of programmes is critical at the micro level 
of resource allocation as well as the policy development and planning stages of the cycle. The goal 




97.   The outcome goals and targets in the Maori education strategy have considerable political 
buy-in. Although the eventual goals are often long-term ones, achievable 2-3 year intermediate 
goals have been included. This enables Ministers to focus on delivering tangible results within the 
electoral cycle. 
 
98.   At a departmental level, departments are required to report in their annual reports on their 
effectiveness in reducing inequalities. The annual report needs to include information on amount 
of expenditure spent reducing inequalities, and information on the effectiveness of that 
expenditure. In addition, departmental material is aggregated into a whole of Government report, 
which is audited and tabled in the house.  
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Section 3: Terminology 
 
Outcomes  - The Public Finance Act (1989) states: 
  
“Outcomes” means the impacts on, or the consequences for, the community of the 
outputs or activities of the Government. 
 
Judgments about outcomes depend upon judgments about causal relationships between 
interventions and the final results.  
 
Outputs  - The Public Finance Act (1989) states: 
  
“Outputs” means the goods or services that are produced by a department, Crown entity, 
Office of Parliament, or other person or body. 
 
For an output to be meaningful as an accountability tool it must be described in ways that 
enable the producer of the output to be held to account for its delivery. To this end output 
performance measures have traditionally been thought of in terms of quality, quantity, 
timeliness and cost. More sophisticated measures of output quality may well make reference 
to the outcomes the output contributes to. In some cases it may be possible to incorporate 
genuine outcome indicators, which matter for accountability purposes, as output quality 
measures. Better specified outputs will also reflect those things which managers can genuinely 
be held accountable for, including outcome and co-ordination risk management. 
 
Government can also intervene via other activities such as regulation, funding, making grants, 
or investing. 
 
States of the world  
 
States of the world information is a snapshot of the way the world is. It is basic statistical 
information that is independent of causal judgments about the relationship between 




An evaluation is a systematic, evidential assessment of a programme or features of it. In the 
outcomes context, we are generally interested in impact evaluation - a systematic attempt to 




Accountability is a function of a relationship between two parties whereby one party confers a 
power on the other subject to a condition that the party receiving the power must account as 
specified for its possession and use. 
 
 
Section 4: Useful Literature 
 
New Zealand websites: 20 
 
www.treasury.govt.nz - Treasury website contains general information on public management 
and budget management 
 
www.ssc.govt.nz - State Services Commission website contains general information on public 
management 
 
www.dpmc.govt.nz - Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet website contains statement of 
Key Government Goals 
 
www.mfe.govt.nz - Ministry for the Environment website contains environmental performance 
indicators 
 
www.ltsa.govt.nz - Land Transport Safety Authority website contains a link to road safety 






Ian Ball. Outcome Specification: Paper presented at the 1992 Public Sector Convention, 
Wellington. 
 
Department of Corrections. Annual Report 2000: Wellington, 2000. 
 
National Road Safety Committee. Road Safety Strategy 2010: Wellington, 2000. 
 
Graham Scott, Peter Bushnell and Nikitin Sallee. Reform of the Core Public Sector: New Zealand 
Experience: Governance, Volume 3, Number 2, April 1990 pp. 138-167. 
 
Most of this material is sourced from Cabinet papers, internal policy discussion documents 




Key Government Goals to Guide Public Sector Policy and Performance 
  
•  Strengthen National Identity and Uphold the Principles of the Treaty of Waitangi 
Celebrate our identity in the world as people who support and defend freedom and
fairness, who enjoy arts, music, movement and sport, and who value our cultural
heritage; and resolve at all times to endeavour to uphold the principles of the Treaty of
Waitangi;
•  Grow an Inclusive, Innovative Economy for the Benefit of All
Develop an economy that adapts to change, provides opportunities and increases
employment, and while closing the gaps, increases incomes for all New Zealanders.
•  Restore Trust in Government and Provide Strong Social Services
Restore trust in government by working in partnerships with communities, providing
strong social services for all, building safe communities and promoting community
development, keeping faith with the electorate, working constructively in Parliament
and promoting a strong and effective public service.
•  Improve New Zealanders’ skills
Foster education and training to enhance and improve the nation's skills so that all
New Zealanders have the best possible future in a changing world.
•  Close the gaps for Maori and Pacific People in Health, Education, Employment and
Housing
Support and strengthen the capacity of Maori and Pacific Island communities,
particularly through education, better health, housing and employment, and better co-
ordination of strategies across sectors, so that we may reduce the gaps that currently
divide our society and offer a good future for all.
•  Protect and Enhance the Environment
Treasure and nurture our environment with protection for eco-systems so that New
Zealand maintains a clean, green environment and rebuilds our reputation as a world
leader in environmental issues.
 
 
 
  
 
 
 